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Abstract
Second-order election research clearly reveals that national
incumbency impacts on European election outcomes but
despite the increasing importance of regions few studies
explore the impact of regional politics. I theorize that gov-
ernmental status at the regional level, regional authority,
and the relative timing of the regional election affects vote
share swings between European and previously held
national elections. Based on an analysis including 12,545
vote share swings for 468 parties that compete elections
held in 209 regions in 11 European Union member states
since 1979, I find strong evidence for prospective regional
voting, that is, voters rewarding parties in government at
the regional level. First, parties that are in national opposi-
tion and in regional government incur larger vote share
gains than parties that are in opposition at both levels. Sec-
ond, these vote share gains become larger when regional
authority increases and, third, when a regional election has
preceded a European election.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The process of European integration includes a development toward multilevel electoral democracy.
The territorial scope of European elections has steadily grown from 6 member states in 1979 to 28 in
2014 and the number of eligible voters in European elections has increased from 178.4 to 394.3 mil-
lion over the same time span (European Commission, 2014). What is often less noticed is that the
proliferation of electoral democracy in Europe has been more pronounced at the regional level.1 In
1979, 95.4 million people could vote in regional elections and this number increased to 327.6 million
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people in 2014 (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel, 2017). In 1979, about half of the people (53%)
who could vote in European elections could also vote in regional elections. In 2014, 19 out of
28 European Union (EU) member states held regional elections and 83% of the total European electorate
could vote in European and regional elections. The nine EU member states that do not hold regional elec-
tions are small countries with 5 million people or less except for Bulgaria which has around 7.4 million
citizens.2 Out of 19 EU member states that hold regional elections, regional authority has increased in
13, it remained constant in 4, and in only 2 countries did regional authority decrease (Hooghe et al.,
2016). These developments over the past four decades point toward the development of a European mul-
tilevel electoral system whereby representative institutions and important decision-making powers are
allocated across regional, national, and European governments.
Despite the tremendous growth in the number and importance of electoral arenas at multiple terri-
torial scales, there is little scholarship that explores the extent to which party and voter behavior in
one electoral arena affects what is going on in another electoral arena (see also Gschwend, 2008). As
Golder et al. (2017, p. 3) note, “Multilevel governance, then, should matter for our understanding of
electoral politics. Only if electoral arenas are independent can a researcher safely ignore the impact
of multiple arenas.” Research on spillover between national and European elections and between
national and regional elections clearly shows that electoral arenas cannot be studied in isolation. Both
literatures often take the second-order election model as their starting point whereby scholars set out
to see in how far party governmental status at the national level impacts vote shares in European and
regional elections (Hix & Marsh, 2007, 2011; Hough & Jeffery, 2006). The second-order model elec-
tion assumes that voters and parties conceive national elections to be first order compared to second-
order regional and European elections because it is national government that makes the important
decisions. Voters are not bothered to turn out in second-order elections and those who do tend to
punish parties governing at the national level and to reward parties in national opposition or small
and new parties (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). There is ample of evidence that
second-order election effects are observable in both regional and European elections. What has been
much less explored is in how far factors arising from regional electoral arenas impact European elec-
tion results. Given the increasing territorial scope and importance of regional elections one may
expect that regional politics have become more important than European and, at least for some
voters, also national politics (Henderson & McEwen, 2015; Schakel & Dandoy, 2014).
In this article, I hypothesize that party governmental status at the regional level, regional author-
ity, and electoral timing of the regional election affect vote share swings between European and pre-
viously held national elections. The empirical analysis provides strong support that all three variables
matter. First, a party tends to incur vote share gains in European elections when it is in opposition at
both the regional and national levels or when the party is in national opposition and in government at
the regional level. Second, these vote share gains are larger when regional authority increases and,
third, when a regional election has preceded a European election. Collectively, these findings provide
strong evidence for regional spillover into the European electoral arena. Thereby, this article demon-
strates that the combined processes of European integration and subnational decentralization have led
to the development of a European multilevel electoral system whereby European election outcomes
are not only affected by factors arising from national but also from regional electoral arenas. The
results also strongly suggest that voters tend to perceive national elections as first order, regional
elections as second order, and European elections as third order.
Section 2 develops four hypotheses on how governmental status at the regional level may affect
European election outcomes. Data and methods are discussed in Section 3 and the results are presented in
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications of the results.
2 SCHAKEL
2 | THEORIZING REGIONAL SPILLOVER INTO EUROPEAN
ELECTIONS
The development toward multilevel electoral democracy in Europe has not gone unnoticed by election
scholars. An often-used theoretical starting point by scholars focusing on European and regional elections
is the second-order election model. The premise of this model is that voters in European and regional
elections are mainly driven by factors arising out of the national electoral arena. Second-order voters tend
to use European and regional elections as a means to signal their discontent with parties in national gov-
ernment by voting for parties in national opposition and small and new parties (Hix & Marsh, 2007,
2011; Hough & Jeffery, 2006). This voting behavior arises because voters tend to conceive European and
regional elections to be less important than national elections as statewide government makes the impor-
tant decisions regarding important policies such as taxes, welfare state and economic policy, and foreign
relations (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Voters who are discontent with national
government are more likely to turnout in less important elections and they tend to use them to express
their dissatisfaction (Lau, 1985; Schakel & Dandoy, 2014).
There is a substantial number of studies which goes beyond the second-order election model and
provide other explanations for European and regional election outcomes. However, what has not
been explored often, to the best of my knowledge, is whether European elections are affected by fac-
tors arising out of the regional electoral arena (but see Schakel, 2018). Studies on regional elections
clearly show that regional government is important for a significant group of voters and for some
voters, regional elections may be more salient than national or European contests (Dandoy &
Schakel, 2013; Liñeira, 2011; Schakel, 2017). One may expect that the vote choice of these voters in
European elections is based on factors arising from the regional electoral arena separate from or
alongside considerations based on national or European politics. In this article, I explore the validity
of four hypotheses on the ways in which regional politics may impact European electoral outcomes.
Following Golder et al. (2017, pp. 18–23) and Gschwend (2008), I differentiate between types of
voters to develop hypotheses on multilevel electoral behavior. National voters tend to care less about
regional or European politics and base their vote choice in European elections on a party's perfor-
mance at the national level. I use the label regional voters for those voters who cast their European
vote on the basis of factors arising out of the regional instead of or alongside factors arising from the
national or European electoral arena. Similarly, European voters base their European vote choice on
the basis of factors arising out of the European instead of or alongside factors arising from the
national or regional electoral arenas.
Drawing on the second-order election model, we may assume that national voters are chiefly
motivated to cast a vote in European elections by their dissatisfaction with a party's performance at
the national level. These voters conceive European elections to be less important than first-order
national elections and they are less motivated to turn out in European elections except for discon-
tented voters who use the European election as a “referendum” or “poll” to express their dissatisfac-
tion with parties in national government. As a result, parties in national government tend to lose vote
share whereas parties in national opposition (and small and new parties) gain vote share in European
elections.
European voters look at the European electoral arena when they make up their minds regarding
their vote in European elections. They see the European election as an important contest in its own
right and they consider the European electoral arena in isolation of the national and regional electoral
arenas (Golder et al., 2017, p. 20). A common assumption is that European voters are relatively rare
because most voters treat European elections as second-order to national elections (Hix & Marsh,
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2011; Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010). Recently, scholars have looked the possibility that some voters
could be motivated to vote based on European-level issues (de Vries, van der Brug, van Egmond, &
van der Eijk, 2011; Golder et al., 2017; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014). The focus
of this article is on regional spillover into the European electoral arena rather than establishing the
impact of European voting on aggregate election outcomes. However, in the models below I include
controls for European voting to isolate the impact of regional voting.
Regional voters deem European elections to be less important than regional (and national) elec-
tions and they use European elections as an opportunity to voice their opinion about regional politics.
Regional voters consider regional elections to be first order, national elections to be second order,
and European elections to be third order elections (see also Golder et al., 2017: 69–73). In contrast to
national voters who predominantly use European elections to electorally punish parties in national
government, regional voters may have two different motivations to voice their opinion about regional
politics in European elections.
A first motivation may be based on an evaluation of a party's performance at the regional level.
The second-order election model may also apply to the relation between regional and European elec-
tions and regional voters deem European elections to be subordinate to regional elections. In this sce-
nario, regional voters use the European election to signal their discontent with parties in regional
government and, as a result, these parties lose vote share whereas parties in regional opposition (and
small and new parties) gain vote share. There is ample of (recent) evidence that some voters conceive
regional elections equally or more important than national elections (e.g., Bechtel, 2012; Golder
et al., 2017; Schakel & Romanova, 2018; Scully, 2013) and a number of authors have found that
turnout in regional contests is often higher than for European elections (e.g., Henderson & McEwen,
2015; Rallings & Trasher, 2005; Schakel & Dandoy, 2014). Therefore, it can be expected that many
voters think that regional elections are more important than European elections. Applying the logic
of the second-order model to the relationship between regional and European elections leads to the
expectation that voters may use their European vote to send a signal of discontent to the parties in
their regional governments:
H1: Parties in regional government lose vote share and parties in regional opposition
win vote share because of retrospective regional voting in European elections.
A second motivation underlying a regional voters' European vote choice is to use their European
vote expressively rather than retrospectively. In this scenario, regional voters vote for a party that
they think will be effective or helpful in voicing or expressing regional interests at the national or
European level. Regions in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United
Kingdom—7 out of the 11 EU member states included in the empirical analysis—exercise shared
rule in addition to self-rule. Shared rule is the authority exercised by regions in the country as a
whole through an upper chamber of parliament and/or through intergovernmental meetings between
national and regional governments (Hooghe et al., 2016). Voting for a regional party that is in gov-
ernment at the regional level may strengthen the position of the region at the national level by send-
ing a signal to national and regional politicians and parties. Just as a national voter, this kind of
regional voter uses a European election to send a signal to the national electoral arena but instead of
punishing parties in national government a regional voter rewards a party in regional government to
strengthen the latter's position domestically.
Many regions that exercise shared rule within the member state can also significantly
impact European policy. Regional ministers in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the United
Kingdom can replace federal ministers during meetings of the Council of Ministers when
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policies are discussed that fall within regional competences. Regional governments in Italy
and Spain meet with their central governments to prediscuss the national position to be taken
up during meetings of the Council of Ministers. Most of these regions have access to the
Council's working groups and representatives from many of these regions are included in the
permanent delegations in Brussels (Keating, Hooghe, & Tatham, 2015; Tatham, 2008, 2011).
Hence, voting for a regional party that is in government at the regional level may strengthen
the position of the region at the European level by sending a signal to European, national,
and regional politicians and parties.
Voters from regions that do not have direct access to the Council of Ministers or its working
groups, that is, regions in Denmark, France, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden—5 out of 11 of
the EU member states included in the empirical analysis—may still have an incentive to use their
European vote to strengthen the position of a party in regional government within the European mul-
tilevel governance system. Regional governments are directly involved in the decision-making pro-
cess of allocating EU structural and cohesion funds through the formulation and implementation of
operational programs (Bachtler & Mendez, 2007; Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2012; Piattoni, 2016).
The EU issues detailed regulations on displaying EU symbols and texts alongside images or texts
from regional, national, or private funders on construction signs as well with emblems on finished
projects (European Commission, 2000, 2006; Osterloh, 2011). Therefore, regional voters may be
well aware of the EU transfers their regions receive and that EU-funded projects are co-funded by
regional and national governments (Chalmers & Dellmuth, 2015).
It may be a strong assumption that many voters are aware of the importance of the role their
regional governments play in the European system of multilevel governance (but see Henceroth &
Oganesyan, 2019). Nevertheless, this role is probably known by regional parties and politicians and
therefore provide strong incentives to mobilize voters in European elections to vote for them
(Dellmuth & Stoffel, 2012; Shikano & Nyhuis, 2019). On top of the above-mentioned reasons, we
may add that many regional governments elect representatives in the Committee of the Regions
which has to be asked for advice on all EU policy with a territorial dimension such as regional devel-
opment but also agriculture, culture, education, transport, and tourism (Piattoni & Schönlau, 2015).
In addition, regional government plays an important role in the decision-making and implementation
of EU policy and a recent estimate found that nearly 70% of EU legislation is implemented by local
and regional authorities (Committee of the Regions, 2009: 3). In sum, parties in regional government
that would like to attract EU funding to their region or would like to have an influence on EU policy
have strong incentives to mobilize regional voters in European elections for their cause (Hepburn,
2016). This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: Parties in regional government win vote share and parties in regional opposition
lose vote share because of expressive (prospective) regional voting in European
elections.
At the aggregate level, the impact of European, national, and regional voting on European elec-
tion outcomes is dependent on the ratios between European, national, and regional voters. I hypothe-
size that the relative share of regional voters is affected by two regional-level variables. First, the
authority exercised by regional government impacts the extent to which voters perceive regional poli-
tics to be important. When regional government makes important decisions about tax rates and socio-
economic and educational policy and is likely to be involved in deciding and implementing national
and EU policy one may expect the share of regional voters to increase and one may expect that
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regional voters will be more inclined to vote either retrospectively or expressively in European elec-
tions, that is, to punish or reward parties in regional government.
H3: The impact of party governmental status at the regional level on retrospective and
expressive regional voting increases when regional governments have more authority.
Second, electoral timing of the regional election vis-à-vis national and European elections may
impact the ratio between national and regional voters. One important hypothesized outcome of the
second-order model is that turnout is low(er) in European than for national elections because voters
perceive European elections to be less important than first-order national elections and therefore
voters do not bother to go to the ballot box. This second-order election effect may be stronger when
a European election is held after a regional election because of voting fatigue among European and
especially national voters who are not bothered to cast a vote in another and even less important elec-
tion (Dandoy & Schakel, 2013; Schakel, 2018). Only regional voters who think that European elec-
tions are a useful tool to signal their (dis)content with a party's performance at the regional level or
who use European elections to voice territorial interests in the European electoral arena or to send a
territorial signal to the national electoral arena are inclined to turn out and cast a vote.
H4: The impact of regional authority and party governmental status at the regional
level on retrospective and expressive regional voting increases when a regional election
has been held in between a European and a previously held national election.
An implicit assumption underlying the hypotheses is that at the aggregate level there are more
national than regional voters and that there are more regional than European voters. In other words,
voters tend to rank national elections first, regional elections second, and European elections third
regarding the importance they attach to these contests. This also means that national spillover into
the European electoral arena is expected to be larger in magnitude than regional spillover. In the
empirical analysis presented below, I take the vote share swing between a European and a previ-
ously held national election as the dependent variable to test the four hypotheses. Analyzing this
vote share swing—instead of a vote share swing between a European and a previously held
regional election—enables me to observe under which conditions the magnitude of national spill-
over becomes smaller because of an increasing significance of regional spillover. In addition,
choosing this type of swing constitutes a stronger empirical test for my hypotheses because it will
be more difficult to detect regional spillover. Furthermore, in order to isolate and assess the addi-
tive impact of regional spillover I need to take account of national spillover. In the supplementary
material S1 (available online), I display the results for models that take a party vote share swing
between a European and a previously held regional election as a dependent variable3 and these
results are shortly discussed at the end of the results section.
In sum, I will explore three factors arising out from the regional electoral arena that may
impact European election outcomes. First and foremost, I hypothesize that party governmental
status at the regional level impacts the European vote, either through retrospective voting that
leads parties in regional government to lose and parties in regional opposition to win vote share
(Hypothesis 1), or through expressive voting which has the opposite effect, that is, parties in
regional government win and parties in regional opposition lose vote share (Hypothesis 2). The
impact of governmental status at the regional level is, in turn, dependent on regional authority
and on the electoral timing of the regional election vis-à-vis the national and European election.
My third hypothesis is that the impact of governmental status at the regional level increases with
regional authority. My fourth hypothesis is that the impacts of governmental status and regional
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authority are larger when a regional election has been held in between a European and a previ-
ously held national election.
3 | DATA, METHOD, AND OPERATIONALIZATION
The empirical (and robustness) analysis includes European, national, and regional elections results in
11 Western EU member states (Table 1).4 Nine EU member states are excluded because they do not
hold regional elections that precludes the possibility of spillover from the regional to the European
electoral arena. Finland and Portugal are excluded because they hold regional elections in very small
subparts of the country, Åland in Finland, and Açores and Madeira in Portugal. Six Eastern European
countries—Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia—are excluded
because of a preponderance of electoral coalitions and high volatility which significantly complicates
the comparison of vote shares across the type of election and across time (Schakel, 2015, 2017). The
11 EU member states included in the analysis represent 73% and 78% of the total electorate in the
28 EU member states for respectively European and regional elections.
The dataset includes 12,545 vote share swings for a total of 468 parties that compete in European,
national, and/or regional elections held in 209 regions in 11 EU member states since 1979 or the first
TABLE 1 Included European Union member states, parties, regions, and elections
European Union







First Last First Last First Last
Austria 21 Länder 9 1999 2014 1999 2013 1995 2013
Belgium 37 Communities and
regions
4 1999 2014 1999 2014 1999 2014
Denmark 19 Amter 15 1979 2004 1977 2001 1978 2001
Regions 5 2009 2014 2007 2011 2005 2013
France 36 Régions 22 1989 2014 1988 2012 1986 2010
Germany 28 Länder (West) 10 1979 2014 1976 2013 1975 2013
Länder (East) 6 1994 2014 1990 2013 1990 2011
Greece 36 Nomoi 48 1999 2009 1996 2007 1998 2006
Peripheria 13 2014 2014 2012 2012 2014 2014
Italy 109 Regioni ordinare 15 1979 2014 1979 2013 1975 2014
Regioni speciale 4 1979 2014 1979 2013 1974 2014
Provincia speciale 2 1979 2014 1979 2013 1978 2013
Netherlands 38 Provincies 12 1979 2014 1977 2012 1978 2011
Spain 82 Comunidades
(nonhistoric)
14 1989 2014 1986 2011 1987 2011
Comunidades
(historic)
3 1989 2014 1986 2011 1984 2012
Ciudiades 2 1989 2014 1986 2011 1987 2011
Sweden 22 Landstinge 21 1999 2014 1998 2010 1998 2011
United Kingdom 40 Devolved entities 4 1999 2014 1997 2010 1998 2012
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year when a country held regional, national, and European elections (Table 1). A party is included
when it receives at least 1 % vote share in a European or national election in at least one region. In
order to make sure that governmental status at the regional level can have an impact on European
election outcomes the dataset only includes European elections that are held once regional elections
have been introduced in an EU member state.
The focus of the empirical analysis is on aggregate electoral outcomes simply because
European election surveys are not suitable to explore regional spillover in European elections.
First, these surveys do not include questions that ask for a vote choice for a previously held
regional election. Analyzing vote share swings (or vote switching probabilities) is crucial to test
the hypotheses. Second, European election surveys often do not contain a region identifier for
respondents and when they do then region samples cannot be usefully employed for a region-
level analysis because they are too small or not representative for the region. I hypothesize that
two regional-level variables (regional authority and timing of the regional election) impact on
the balance between regional and national (and European) voters and therefore I need to know in
which region an individual has cast her vote.
The second-order election model predicts that national voting leads parties in national government
to lose vote share whereas parties in national opposition (and small and new parties) should win vote
share in the less important European election (Hix & Marsh, 2007, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980).
When retrospective regional voting occurs alongside national (retrospective or second-order) voting
then I may expect parties in national and regional government to lose more vote share than parties
that are in national or in regional government. Similarly, parties in national and regional opposition
should win more vote share than parties that are in national or in regional opposition. When expres-
sive regional voting occurs alongside national (second-order or retrospective) voting then I may
expect parties in national opposition and regional government to win most vote share and parties in
national government and regional opposition to lose most vote share.
The main independent variable is a nominal variable that indicates a party's governmental status
at the national and regional levels that can take up five values: in government at both levels, in oppo-
sition at both levels, in government at the regional but in opposition at the national level, in govern-
ment at the national but in opposition at the regional level, and an “other” category (e.g., parties that
competed in an election but did not manage to win a seat). The focus of the empirical analysis is on
the electoral success of the main parties in national and regional governments, that is, those govern-
ment and opposition parties that have the largest vote share.5 Robustness analysis 1 in S1 displays
the results for all parties that are in government or in opposition at the national and regional levels.
To account for (possible) European voting—that is, voting on the basis of the party governmental
status at the European level—the models include a dummy variable that scores positive when a party
delivers a European Commissioner.
I hypothesize that the impact of governmental status at the regional level on a party's electoral
success in European elections depends on regional authority and electoral timing of the European,
national, and regional elections. The models include interactions between governmental status,
regional authority and electoral timing of the regional election vis-à-vis the European and national
elections. The Regional Authority Index (RAI) measures regional authority according to two dimen-
sions (self-rule and shared rule) which are each measured by five subdimensions (Hooghe et al.,
2016).6 Scores may range from 1—deconcentrated central state government—to a maximum of 30.
A dummy variable indicates whether a regional election has been held in between a European elec-
tion and a previously held national election. This dummy scores one when a national election is
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followed by a regional and then a European election. When this dummy scores 0, a European elec-
tion followed after a national election.
The models include several control variables in order to make sure to isolate the effects of
regional spillover. Second-order election effects depend on the timing of the European election in the
national election cycle and parties in national government tend to lose most vote share—and small,
new and opposition parties tend to win most vote share—when a European election is held midterm
the national election cycle whereas losses and gains tend to level off the closer a European election is
held to the previous or next national election (Hix & Marsh, 2007, 2011; Reif & Schmitt, 1980). The
models include a cycle variable which varies between 0 and 1 and which indicates the time elapsed
in a national election cycle which is 4 years in most cases, that is, a score of 1 indicates that a
European election has been held 4 years after a national election. To tap into the parabolic function,
a cycle-squared variable is also included. Second-order election effects increase with a deteriorating
economy and therefore the models include regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) relative to
national GDP whereby scores above/below 100% indicate that regions are performing economically
better/worse than the country average.
The control variables include six dummies. Two dummies indicate whether a European elec-
tion has been held simultaneous with a national election and whether a national election has coin-
cided with a regional election. Another set of two dummies indicate whether a different electoral
system is used for European elections when compared to national or regional elections (0 = no;
1 = yes, i.e., a mixed or majoritarian electoral system). Two other dummies account for compul-
sory voting (0 = no; 1 = yes) and whether elections take place in a Rokkan region (0 = no;
1 = yes), that is, regions with strong regional identities. The Rokkan region dummy scores posi-
tive when a majority of people in a region speaks a different language from the main national
language; when a region has a history of sovereign statehood for at least 30 years between
1,200 AD and 1950; and/or when a region is an island or archipelago and at least 30 km from the
mainland (Hooghe & Marks, 2016). The size of parties is considered by including a party's
regional vote share won in the previously held national election and the size of regions is taken
into account by a ratio variable that varies between 0 and 1 and which is derived by dividing the
regional electorate by the statewide electorate. Table 3 includes descriptive statistics for all
dependent and independent variables.
Party vote shares are clustered within elections that are held within regions and in order to
account for this clustering I run multilevel linear regression models whereby I include random effects
for elections and regions. Regions are grouped within 11 EU member states and (most) European
elections are held on the same date across the EU (Table 1). To account for this clustering of obser-
vations, the models include fixed effects for EU member states (Austria is the base category) and
European elections (the first election of 1979 is the base category).7
4 | RESULTS: HOW A PARTY'S GOVERNMENTAL STATUS
AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL AFFECTS ITS ELECTORAL
SUCCESS IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
Table 2 displays the results of three models that include 12 control variables, 7 dummies for EU
elections, and 10 dummies for EU member states. The first model includes the three main inde-
pendent variables of interest, governmental status at the national and regional levels, RAI scores,
and a dummy to indicate whether a regional election was held in between a European and a pre-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































status and RAI-scores and the third model includes a three-way interaction between governmen-
tal status, RAI scores, and the dummy. The analysis focuses on the largest parties but a robust-
ness analysis that includes party vote share swings for all parties in government and opposition
at the national and regional levels as a dependent variable reveals that the results are robust but
the magnitude of the impacts is smaller (robustness analysis 1 in S1).
A comparison across models reveals that governmental status reaches statistical significance
but RAI-scores and the dummy “regional election held in between” do not. However, the interac-
tion between governmental status and RAI scores and the three-way interaction of the former
two variables with the dummy “regional election held in between” do reach statistical signifi-
cance. In addition, a comparison across the three models reveals that the interaction effects are
additive which indicates that all three variables should be considered when studying vote share
swings between European and previously held national elections. Thereby, the results strongly
suggest that there is significant spillover from the regional into the European electoral arena.
First, I explore the impact of RAI scores in Figure 1 which displays the marginal effects of
increasing RAI scores on the vote share swings of parties with different governmental status at
the national and regional levels. The estimates are calculated for the minimum score of 7 (Danish
regions) up to the maximum score of 27 (German Länder) and the estimates are based on Model
3 in Table 1.
The results in Figure 1 are quite revealing. Parties in national government clearly tend to incur
vote share losses no matter whether the party is in government or opposition at the regional level. As
hypothesized, parties in national opposition tend to gain vote share in European elections but only
when RAI scores are above 11. When RAI scores further increase it are parties in national opposition
and in regional government which gain most vote share and they gain more vote share than parties
FIGURE 1 Marginal effects of regional authority on vote share swings between European and previously
held national elections for five different types of parties. Marginal effects (averages and 95% confidence intervals)
are calculated on the basis of the results for Model 3 of Table 2 whereby interval variables are set at their mean,
nominal variables at their mode (which is 0 for all dummy variables), and European election at 1999 (European
Union member states are not set at a particular value because of a high correlation to regional authority index
scores). Descriptive statistics are provided in Table A1
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that are in opposition at both levels and once the RAI score goes beyond 22 (i.e., Länder in Austria
and Germany, Gemeenschappen in Belgium, and Spanish comunidades autónomas). These results
are in line with Hypothesis 2 which reflect the assumption that parties in regional government may
incur vote share gains rather than Hypothesis 1 which takes the second-order election model as a
starting point and assumes that both regional and national voters use European elections to punish
parties in national and regional government. In addition, Figure 1 provides strong support for
Hypothesis 3 that expects that (prospective) regional voting is enhanced by increasing regional
authority.
The impact of a party's governmental status at the national level is clearly dominant and deter-
mines whether a party is likely to lose or gain vote share but regional incumbency matters too.
Parties that are in national opposition but are in government at the regional level gain most vote
share. This result is in line with empirical evidence that regions are more likely to “bypass” cen-
tral government and to seek to directly influence EU policy when the region is governed by the
main national opposition party (Tatham, 2010). These parties have strong incentives to mobilize
regional voters in European elections to vote for representatives whose role in the European mul-
tilevel governance system will be strengthened accordingly either at the domestic, European, or
both levels.
Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of holding a regional election in between a European and a
previously held national election. Given the important impact of RAI scores, the marginal effects are
shown for a similar range of RAI scores as for Figure 1. To clearly distinguish the impact of the
FIGURE 2 Marginal effects (averages and 95% confidence intervals) of the timing of the regional election vis-à-vis
the European and previously held national election on vote share swings between European and previously held national
elections (y-axis) across regional authority index scores (x-axis) for four different types of parties. See notes to Figure 1
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timing of a regional election vis-à-vis European and national elections, Figure 2 displays one line for
the sequence regional–national–European elections (dotted line; effects are similar as those displayed
in Figure 1) and one line for the sequence national–regional–European elections (solid line; dummy
“regional election held in between” scores 1). The marginal effects are shown by the multilevel gov-
ernance status of a party, that is, party is in national and regional government (Figure 2a, squares),
party is in national government and in regional opposition (Figure 2b, crosses), party is in national
opposition and regional government (Figure 2c, diamonds), and party is in national and regional
opposition (Figure 2d, triangles).8
The impact of electoral timing is statistically significant and this impact is especially noticeable when
regions score 12 points or higher on the RAI index. Parties in national and regional government will lose
vote share when a European election is held after a national election but these parties will gain vote share
when a European election is preceded by a regional election (Figure 2a). In contrast, parties in national
and regional opposition cannot expect to win vote share in European elections when a regional instead of
a national election has preceded a European election (Figure 2d). Parties in national government can
expect to lose vote share except when a regional election has preceded a European election and when
RAI scores are higher than 22 (Figure 2b). Finally, parties in national opposition and regional government
are likely to incur vote share gains in European elections—especially when RAI scores go beyond
12 points—and they are more likely to do so when a regional election has preceded a European election
(Figure 2c).
The patterns arising from Figure 2 corroborates Hypothesis 4 that (prospective) regional voting
increases when a regional instead of a national election precedes a European election. In these
instances, parties in regional government win more vote share in a European election no matter its
governmental status at the national level (Figure 2a,c). Figure 2 also suggests that second-order vot-
ing by national voters occurs alongside prospective regional voting by regional voters especially
when a national election precedes a European election. In these cases, parties in national government
tend to lose more vote share (Figure 2a,b) and parties in national opposition tend to win more vote
share (Figure 2d) compared to European elections that are preceded by regional elections.
Overall, the results indicate more support for prospective than for retrospective regional voting in
European elections. However, the results may be biased toward prospective regional voting considering
that the dependent variable is a party vote share swing between European and previously held national
instead of regional elections. I ran additional robustness analyses whereby I used the same models but
now with party vote swings between European and previously held regional elections as dependent vari-
able (robustness analysis 2 in S1). The results appear to be robust for vote share swings between
European and previously held regional elections when it concerns the overall impact of regional authority
and relative timing between regional, national, and European elections.
There is one important difference which is that the magnitudes of the vote share swings tend to be
larger (i.e., more negative). For example, the “starting value” of the vote share swing for a party in
national and regional government in a region with a RAI score of 7 points is −3.1% for a European-
to-national vote share swing (Figure 1) but it is −7.6% for a European-to-regional vote share swing
(robustness analysis 2). This may indicate a significant portion of retrospective regional voting along-
side prospective regional voting. Further evidence for retrospective regional voting is provided by
the robustness analysis in Figure S4a; the main difference is that RAI scores need to be above
22 (instead of 12) for these parties to win vote share when a European election is compared to a pre-
viously held regional election (robustness analysis 2). Thus, only in highly authoritative regions pro-
spective regional voting (i.e., rewarding parties in regional government) seems to outweigh
retrospective regional voting (i.e., sanctioning parties in regional government).
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The modeling strategy in this article is not geared toward detecting European voting—that
is, voting on the basis of party governmental status at the European level—because the models
include an independent variable which only takes party governmental status at the national and
regional levels into account. However, the models displayed in Table 2 include a dummy vari-
able which scores positive when a party delivers an EU commissioner. The results indicate that
supplying an EU commissioner earns a party a vote share swing bonus of close to 1%. This
finding strongly suggests that European voting cannot be ruled out but further research is
warranted.
It is important to note that the inclusion of many control variables in the models (Table 2) excludes
alternative explanations for the results. For example, parties in opposition at the national level but in gov-
ernment at the regional level gain most vote share (Figure 1) and this may (also) be caused by the fact that
parties in regional government tend to be large(r) parties. However, the models control for the size of
parties by including the regional vote share won by parties in the preceding national election. The signifi-
cant impact of holding a regional election in between a European and a previously held national election
(Figure 2) may just reflect the fact that more time has elapsed between the European and previously held
national election compared to an election sequence when no regional election has been held in between.
The models include a cycle and a cycle-squared variable which directly tap into the impact of the timing
of the European election in the national electoral cycle.
5 | DISCUSSION
The results presented in this article provide overwhelming evidence that factors arising out of the
regional electoral arena impact European election outcomes. First, and most importantly, it is shown
that the governmental status at the regional level modifies national spillover into European elections.
Parties in national government lose vote share whereas parties in national opposition gain vote share
in European elections. However, a party wins most vote share when a party is in government at the
regional level and in opposition at the national level rather than being in opposition at both levels.
Second, the impact of governmental status at the national and regional levels depends on regional
authority. Parties are likely to lose vote share no matter their governmental status at the national and
regional levels when elections are held in regions with a RAI score of 10 or below (e.g., Danish
regions, French régions, and Greek nomoi). Third, the impacts of governmental status and regional
authority are particularly noticeable when a regional election has preceded a European election. Col-
lectively, these findings strongly suggest that regional politics significantly affects European election
outcomes.
The findings presented in this article are based on an analysis of vote share swings aggregated at
the regional level. To the very least, the analysis reveals that the impact of factors arising out of the
regional electoral arena are systematically and statistically significantly related to vote share swings
between European and previously held national elections. However, an inquiry into whether voters
indeed base their vote choice in European elections on governmental status of parties at the regional
level requires an analysis of election survey data. To the best of my knowledge, there are no
European election surveys that systematically and comparatively ask questions to voters about their
vote choice in preceding regional elections or ask questions to tap into vote motivations that relate to
regional politics. Similar to the study by Golder et al. (2017, p. 11) this article also leads to “One
clear conclusion [which] is that scholars should be encouraged to develop a habit of asking about
multiple electoral arenas when surveying voters, rather than focusing on a single level (typically the
national one).”
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Scholarship on European elections has provided overwhelming evidence that voters tend to treat
European contests as second-order to national elections. In this article, I present strong evidence that
many regional voters treat European elections as second-order to regional elections and that regional
voters vote prospectively (alongside retrospective regional voting) in European elections. In other
words, European elections may gain a third-order status when regional government becomes more
important (see also Golder et al., 2017, pp. 142–143). This is an important finding because over the
past three decades regional electoral democracy has become more widespread and regional govern-
ment has become more important. Europe has developed into a multilevel electoral system whereby
representative institutions and significant decision-making powers are allocated across regional,
national, and European governments and this development calls for a wider research agenda on
examining the causes and effects of spillover between electoral arenas (see also Bechtel, 2012;
Schakel, 2018; Swenden & Maddens, 2009).
ENDNOTES
1Regional government is defined as an intermediate tier in between a local and national tier which has on average at
least 150,000 inhabitants across the units. This population criterion is relaxed for individual jurisdictions that stick out
from a tier of government that meets the population threshold, that is, special autonomous and asymmetric regions
(Hooghe et al., 2016, p. 15).
2These EU member states are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia.
Out of the 19 EU member states that hold regional elections only Croatia has less than 5 million inhabitants (i.e., 4.2
million).
3The supplementary material S1 (available online) also includes a robustness analysis with models that take vote share
swings between European and previously held European elections as a dependent variable.
4Replication files (Stata syntax and dataset) for the analysis below and for the three robustness checks presented in the
supplementary material S1 are available on www.arjanschakel.nl
5The categories of the governmental status variable for the main parties are as follows: the party is the largest govern-
ment party at both levels, the party is the largest opposition party at both levels, or the party is largest government party
at the regional/national level and the largest opposition party at the national/regional level. Robustness Check 1 of the
results in S1 is based on “all” parties: the party is part of the government at both levels, the party is in opposition at
both levels, or the party is in government at the regional/national level and in opposition party at the national/regional
level. Parties that compete in one election only or compete in elections but do not manage to win a seat are included in
an “other” category.
6Self-rule measures the extent of independence of a regional government from national government (institu-
tional depth), the range of a regional government's authority over policy in its jurisdiction (policy scope), the
authority a regional government has over taxation within its own jurisdiction (fiscal autonomy), the authority
of a regional government to borrow on financial markets (borrowing autonomy), and whether a regional gov-
ernment is endowed with representative institutions (representation). Shared rule measures the extent to which
a regional government co-determines national policy-making (law-making), the extent to which a regional gov-
ernment codetermines national executive policy in intergovernmental fora (executive control), the extent to
which a regional government co-determines how national tax revenues are distributed (fiscal control), the
extent to which a regional government co-determines the restrictions placed on borrowing (borrowing control),
and the extent to which regional government can initiate or constrain constitutional reform (constitutional
reform).
7European elections taking place in one EU member state only are excluded, that is, the dataset does not include
the first European elections held in Greece (1981), Spain (1987), Sweden (1995), and Austria (1996).
8The results for other parties are not shown because there is no substantially and statistically significant impact for
regional authority (see Figure 1) or for the dummy “regional election held in between”.
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TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Vote share swing European to national 0.01 4.83 −30.48 33.31
Vote share swing European to regional 0.28 5.30 −45.72 37.62
Vote share swing European (t) to European (t–1) −0.34 4.89 −37.10 37.50
1 = gov nat–gov reg (main parties) 0.04 0.20 0 1
2 = gov nat–opp reg (main parties) 0.03 0.16 0 1
3 = opp nat–gov reg (main parties) 0.03 0.16 0 1
4 = opp nat–opp reg (main parties) 0.03 0.18 0 1
1 = gov nat–gov reg (all parties) 0.08 0.27 0 1
2 = gov nat–opp reg (all parties) 0.07 0.25 0 1
3 = opp nat–gov reg (all parties) 0.06 0.25 0 1
4 = opp nat–opp reg (all parties) 0.19 0.39 0 1
Regional authority index 15.23 5.87 1 27
Dummy regional election in between 0.34 0.47 0 1
European Union (EU) commissioner 0.10 0.30 0 1
Cycle 1.86 1.04 0 4.08
Cycle2 4.52 4.04 0 16.69
Simultaneous European and national elections 0.01 0.09 0 1
Simultaneous European and regional elections 0.11 0.32 0 1
Compulsory voting 0.14 0.35 0 1
Different electoral system between EU national 0.39 0.49 0 1
Different electoral system between EU regional 0.33 0.47 0 1
Rokkan region 0.25 0.43 0 1
Regional economy 95.52 24.64 46.09 232.30
Size party 8.09 12.70 0 67.97
Size region 0.06 0.07 0 0.61
EU election 1979 = base category 0.05 0.25 0 1
1984 dummy 0.05 0.21 0 1
1989 dummy 0.10 0.30 0 1
1994 dummy 0.12 0.33 0 1
1999 dummy 0.19 0.39 0 1
2004 dummy 0.17 0.38 0 1
2009 dummy 0.17 0.37 0 1
2014 dummy 0.15 0.36 0 1




Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Belgium dummy 0.02 0.13 0 1
Denmark dummy 0.10 0.29 0 1
France dummy 0.13 0.33 0 1
Greece dummy 0.10 0.30 0 1
Germany dummy 0.16 0.36 0 1
Italy dummy 0.20 0.40 0 1
Netherlands dummy 0.08 0.27 0 1
Spain dummy 0.11 0.31 0 1
Sweden dummy 0.08 0.26 0 1
United Kingdom dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1
Note: The total number of observations is 12,545 and 7,072 for vote share swing European (t) to European (t–1). The table also
includes descriptive statistics for the variables included in the robustness analyses displayed in the supplementary material S1
(available online). Gov nat - gov reg, party is in national and regional government; gov nat - opp reg, party is in national government
and in regional opposition; opp nat - gov reg, party is in national opposition and in regional government; opp nat - opp reg, party is in
national and regional opposition.
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Table S1: Regression analysis of party vote share swings between European and previously 
held national elections – all parties.  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. 
1 = gov nat - gov reg 0.22 0.19  -3.27 0.44 ** -3.68 0.50 ** 
2 = gov nat - opp reg -0.59 0.19 ** -2.46 0.45 ** -2.71 0.55 ** 
3 = opp nat - gov reg 2.80 0.19 ** -1.82 0.48 ** -2.19 0.57 ** 
4 = opp nat - opp reg 1.16 0.11 ** -1.56 0.30 ** -2.03 0.36 ** 
Regional authority index 0.01 0.02  -0.08 0.03 ** -0.09 0.03 ** 
1 * RAI    0.23 0.03 ** 0.23 0.03 ** 
2 * RAI    0.12 0.03 ** 0.14 0.04 ** 
3 * RAI    0.30 0.03 ** 0.31 0.03 ** 
4 * RAI    0.19 0.02 ** 0.23 0.02 ** 
Dummy reg elec in between 0.01 0.11  0.02 0.11  -0.22 0.33  
1 * dummy       2.57 1.03 * 
2 * dummy       0.99 0.94  
3 * dummy       2.03 1.06  
4 * dummy       1.29 0.62 * 
Dummy * RAI       0.01 0.02  
1 * RAI * dummy       -0.07 0.06  
2 * RAI * dummy       -0.04 0.06  
3 * RAI * dummy       -0.06 0.06  
4 * RAI * dummy       -0.12 0.04 ** 
EU commissioner 0.97 0.17 ** 0.92 0.16 ** 0.92 0.16 ** 
Cycle -0.32 0.17  -0.39 0.17 * -0.43 0.17 * 
Cycle2 0.05 0.04  0.08 0.04  0.09 0.04 * 
Simultaneous eu-nat -0.05 0.58  -0.14 0.58  -0.13 0.58  
Simultaneous nat-reg -0.02 0.24  -0.04 0.24  -0.04 0.24  
Compulsory voting -0.13 0.21  -0.21 0.20  -0.22 0.22  
Diff. elec sys EU-nat -0.43 0.26  -0.54 0.25 * -0.54 0.26 * 
Diff. elec sys EU-reg 0.16 0.18  0.09 0.18  0.09 0.18  
Rokkan region 0.02 0.10  0.00 0.10  0.01 0.10  
Regional economy 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Size party -0.21 0.01 ** -0.21 0.00 ** -0.22 0.00 ** 
Size region -0.28 0.66  -0.18 0.66  -0.17 0.65  
EU election 1979 = base          
1984 0.11 0.25  0.12 0.24  0.16 0.25  
1989 -0.15 0.22  -0.14 0.22  -0.11 0.22  
1994 -0.42 0.22  -0.44 0.22 * -0.46 0.22 * 
1999 -0.05 0.22  -0.02 0.22  -0.03 0.22  
2004 -0.06 0.23  -0.04 0.23  -0.05 0.23  
2009 -0.05 0.24  -0.03 0.24  -0.03 0.24  
2014 -0.34 0.23  -0.28 0.23  -0.30 0.23  
EU-member Austria = base          
Belgium -0.55 0.49  -0.48 0.48  -0.53 0.49  
Denmark -0.48 0.40  -0.48 0.39  -0.53 0.40  
France 0.01 0.49  0.06 0.48  0.02 0.48  
Greece -0.53 0.29  -0.23 0.29  -0.22 0.29  
Germany -0.29 0.55  -0.35 0.55  -0.38 0.55  
Italy -0.72 0.36 * -0.57 0.36  -0.59 0.36  
Netherlands -0.71 0.32 * -0.81 0.32 * -0.88 0.32 ** 
Spain  -0.54 0.28  -0.31 0.28  -0.28 0.28  
Sweden -0.69 0.44  -0.58 0.44  -0.56 0.44  
United Kingdom -0.07 0.53  -0.04 0.53  -0.09 0.53  
Constant 2.34 0.63 ** 3.76 0.64 ** 3.94 0.64 ** 
Variance region 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance election 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance party 17.8 0.23 ** 17.5 0.23 ** 17.4 0.22 ** 
Wald chi2 3910  4221  4286  
Log likelihood -35857   -35740   -35716   
 
Notes: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel linear regression model 
whereby 12,545 party vote share swings are clustered in 1,028 election pairs (European 
versus previously held national elections) held in 209 regions in 11 EU-member states (see 





Table S2: Regression analysis of party vote share swings between European and previously 
held regional elections. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. 
1 = gov nat - gov reg -6.46 0.32 ** -10.95 0.66 ** -10.09 0.75 ** 
2 = gov nat - opp reg -2.44 0.34 ** -7.54 0.72 ** -8.78 0.91 ** 
3 = opp nat - gov reg -5.11 0.35 ** -10.41 0.73 ** -13.30 0.91 ** 
4 = opp nat - opp reg -1.55 0.30 ** -7.49 0.68 ** -8.44 0.75 ** 
Regional authority index 0.04 0.03  0.00 0.03  0.00 0.03  
1 * RAI    0.30 0.04 ** 0.17 0.04 ** 
2 * RAI    0.35 0.04 ** 0.39 0.06 ** 
3 * RAI    0.37 0.05 ** 0.50 0.06 ** 
4 * RAI    0.40 0.04 ** 0.49 0.05 ** 
Dummy reg elec in between 0.09 0.13  0.07 0.13  -0.32 0.35  
1 * dummy       -1.99 1.44  
2 * dummy       3.59 1.41 * 
3 * dummy       8.60 1.47 ** 
4 * dummy       3.32 1.58 * 
Dummy * RAI       0.01 0.02  
1 * RAI * dummy       0.36 0.08 ** 
2 * RAI * dummy       -0.10 0.09  
3 * RAI * dummy       -0.37 0.09 ** 
4 * RAI * dummy       -0.31 0.09 ** 
EU commissioner 0.92 0.20 ** 0.85 0.20 ** 0.87 0.20 ** 
Cycle -0.30 0.20  -0.47 0.20 ** -0.49 0.20 * 
Cycle2 0.05 0.05  0.10 0.05 * 0.10 0.05 * 
Simultaneous eu-nat -0.08 0.69 * -0.20 0.68  -0.28 0.68  
Simultaneous nat-reg 0.05 0.28  0.02 0.28  0.04 0.28  
Compulsory voting -0.28 0.24  -0.29 0.24  -0.31 0.25  
Diff. elec sys EU-nat -0.70 0.30  -0.81 0.30 ** -0.80 0.30 ** 
Diff. elec sys EU-reg 0.01 0.22  -0.06 0.21  -0.06 0.21  
Rokkan region 0.10 0.12  0.11 0.12  0.10 0.12  
Regional economy 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Size party -0.03 0.01 ** -0.03 0.01 ** -0.03 0.01 ** 
Size region -0.74 0.78  -0.84 0.77  -0.86 0.77  
EU election 1979 = base          
1984 0.07 0.29  0.15 0.29  0.13 0.29  
1989 0.05 0.26  0.20 0.26  0.21 0.26  
1994 0.04 0.26  0.14 0.26  0.10 0.26  
1999 0.39 0.26  0.57 0.26 * 0.52 0.26 * 
2004 0.30 0.27  0.52 0.27  0.46 0.27  
2009 0.22 0.28  0.45 0.28  0.43 0.28  
2014 0.08 0.28  0.31 0.27  0.29 0.27  
EU-member Austria = base          
Belgium 0.23 0.58  0.28 0.57  0.39 0.57  
Denmark 0.78 0.47  0.73 0.46  0.82 0.46  
France 1.51 0.58 ** 1.64 0.57 ** 1.70 0.57 ** 
Greece -0.08 0.35  -0.22 0.34  -0.22 0.34  
Germany 1.64 0.65 * 1.74 0.65 ** 1.88 0.64 ** 
Italy 1.06 0.43 * 1.09 0.43 * 1.15 0.42 ** 
Netherlands 0.47 0.38  0.48 0.37  0.51 0.37  
Spain  0.45 0.33  0.33 0.33  0.36 0.33  
Sweden 0.75 0.53  0.65 0.52  0.73 0.52  
United Kingdom 1.24 0.63 * 1.14 0.62  1.16 0.62  
Constant -0.05 0.75   0.64 0.74   0.63 0.74   
Variance region 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance election 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance party 24.96 0.32 ** 24.45 0.34 ** 24.15 0.31 ** 
Wald chi2 1558  1852  2027  
Log likelihood -37980   -35850   -37775   
 
Notes: * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel linear regression model 
whereby 12,545 party vote share swings are clustered in 1,028 election pairs (European 
versus previously held regional elections) held in 209 regions in 11 EU-member states (see 





Table S3: Regression analysis of party vote share swings between European and previously 
held European elections. 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. beta s.e. sig. 
1 = gov nat - gov reg -3.71 0.35 ** -2.57 0.75 ** -1.79 0.83 * 
2 = gov nat - opp reg -1.81 0.38 ** -1.31 0.81  -0.03 0.95  
3 = opp nat - gov reg -2.15 0.38 ** -4.35 0.79 ** -6.71 0.95 ** 
4 = opp nat - opp reg -1.26 0.31 ** -3.09 0.71 ** -3.54 0.79 ** 
Regional authority index -0.07 0.04  -0.08 0.04 * -0.08 0.04 * 
1 * RAI    -0.07 0.04 * -0.13 0.05 ** 
2 * RAI    -0.03 0.05  -0.09 0.06  
3 * RAI    0.15 0.05 ** 0.31 0.06 ** 
4 * RAI    0.12 0.04 ** 0.14 0.05 ** 
Dummy reg elec in 
between -0.22 0.18  -0.22 0.18  -0.16 0.49  
1 * dummy       -2.94 1.73  
2 * dummy       -5.47 1.76 ** 
3 * dummy       7.52 1.64 ** 
4 * dummy       2.51 1.65  
Dummy * RAI       -0.01 0.03  
1 * RAI * dummy       0.23 0.09 ** 
2 * RAI * dummy       0.24 0.10 * 
3 * RAI * dummy       -0.44 0.10 * 
4 * RAI * dummy       -0.10 0.10  
EU commissioner 0.10 0.22  -0.01 0.22  0.07 0.22  
Cycle -1.73 0.28 ** -1.77 0.28 ** -1.75 0.28 ** 
Cycle2 0.43 0.07 ** 0.45 0.07 ** 0.44 0.07 ** 
Simultaneous eu-nat -2.24 0.80 ** -2.27 0.80 ** -2.31 0.79 ** 
Simultaneous nat-reg 0.25 0.34  0.24 0.34  0.28 0.34  
Compulsory voting -0.98 0.34 ** -0.98 0.34 ** -0.97 0.36 ** 
Diff. elec sys EU-nat -3.06 0.44 ** -3.06 0.44 ** -3.01 0.44 ** 
Diff. elec sys EU-reg 1.33 0.29 ** 1.33 0.28 ** 1.41 0.29 ** 
Rokkan region 0.05 0.16  0.06 0.16  0.05 0.16  
Reg. economy 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Size party 0.03 0.01 ** 0.03 0.01 ** 0.03 0.01 ** 
Size region 0.19 1.00  0.18 0.99  0.12 0.99  
EU election 1984 = base          
1989 0.05 0.32  0.07 0.32  0.08 0.32  
1994 -1.00 0.32 ** -1.00 0.32 ** -1.02 0.33 ** 
1999 0.59 0.32  0.61 0.32  0.53 0.32  
2004 0.07 0.34  0.09 0.34  0.02 0.34  
2009 -0.15 0.36  -0.11 0.36  -0.16 0.36  
2014 -0.13 0.34  -0.07 0.34  -0.10 0.35  
EU-member Austria = base          
Belgium 1.52 0.68 * 1.53 0.68 * 1.56 0.69 * 
Denmark -0.53 0.58  -0.53 0.57  -0.56 0.58  
France 2.28 0.77 ** 2.31 0.77 ** 2.17 0.77 ** 
Greece 0.46 0.41  0.47 0.41  0.49 0.41  
Germany 1.81 0.88 * 1.81 0.88 * 1.70 0.88  
Italy 0.73 0.55  0.74 0.55  0.67 0.55  
Netherlands 0.02 0.46  0.01 0.45  0.00 0.46  
Spain  0.54 0.40  0.52 0.40  0.49 0.40  
Sweden -0.73 0.64  -0.76 0.64  -0.78 0.63  
United Kingdom 1.11 0.77  1.07 0.77  0.99 0.77  
Constant 2.30 0.99 * 2.42 0.99 * 2.46 0.99 * 
Variance region 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance election 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Variance party 22.97 0.39 ** 22.9 0.4 ** 22.75 0.39 ** 
Wald chi2 298  321  371  
Log likelihood -21118   -21107   -21083   
 
Notes: * p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01. Shown are the results of a multilevel linear regression model 
whereby 7,072 party vote share swings are clustered in 944 election pairs (European versus 
previously held European elections) held in 196 regions in 11 EU-member states (see Table 
1). 
 
 
